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Abstract
A simple trading model based on pair pattern strategy space with holding periods is pro-
posed. Power-law behaviors are observed for the return variance σ2, the price impact H
and the predictability K for both models with linear and square root impact functions. The
sum of the traders’ wealth displays a positive value for the model with square root price
impact function, and a qualitative explanation is given based on the observation of the con-
ditional excess demand 〈A|u〉. An evolutionary trading model is further proposed, and the
elimination mechanism effectively changes the behavior of the traders highly performed in
the model without evolution. The trading model with other types of traders, e.g., traders
with the MG’s strategies and producers, are also carefully studied.
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1 Introduction
The standard Minority Game (MG) introduced and studied by Challet and Zhang
[1, 2] was initially designed as a simplification of Arthur’s famous El Farol’s Bar
problem [3]. It describes a system in which many heterogeneous traders adaptively
compete for a scarce resource, and it captures some key features of a generic mar-
ket mechanism and the basic interaction between the traders and public informa-
tion. However, it is a highly simplified model, not suitable to compare with real
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financial market trading. To make it more realistic in comparison with the real mar-
kets, different variations [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] of the standard MG are consequently
proposed. For example, the inactive strategy is introduced, which grants the traders
with the possibility of not trading and thus the number of traders actively trading
at each time step varies throughout the game. This type of extension is called the
grand canonical MG, and it produces the main characteristics of the stock markets,
e.g., the ”fat tail” return distribution and the long-range volatility correlations.
In the standard MG and most of its variations, the strategies give predictions for
the next time step based on the current state of the history, and upon which traders
make instantaneous trading action with an horizon not more than one time step. For
example, the MG-based models with dynamic capitals [5, 6], in which the wealth
of the traders is updated according to the current trading price and has no relation
with the trades they have made previously. The payoff raised from the price change
at the next time step is grant to the trader immediately after a single trade. In fact
traders have asset holding periods and make profits from price difference between
two consecutive trading actions of buying and selling in the real stock markets. To
find a strategy space with holding periods, that traders open or close their positions
and hold their positions reasonably is a great challenge for modeling speculation.
Recently, a new model based on a simple pattern-based strategy space with holding
periods is proposed by Challet [11]. In this model, the strategy space is composed
of a sequence of patterns, i.e., history signals. Traders open or close positions when
the current pattern is the pattern listed in the strategy space, and hold positions
between patterns. The kind of position he/she might take, i.e., buying or selling
is determined by the average price return between two consecutive occurrences
of patterns. The explicitly trading action of buying or selling is not fixed with the
patterns. A simplest case that the strategy space consists of only one pair of patterns
is mainly considered.
Inspired from Challet’s work, we introduce a new pattern-based speculation model
in which the patterns strategy space is split into several sub-spaces composed by
pairs of patterns. Different from Challet’s model, we defined the explicitly trading
actions of the pair patterns. One strategy consists of a pair of patterns, which denote
the history signals for buying and selling. It is reasonable to assume that the trader
base their decisions on patterns or history signals since they may have some expe-
riences and know when to buy or sell according to the history signals. The order of
the pair patterns does not make any sense, which means the position can be opened
by buying/selling if the history signal for buying/selling comes first. Therefore, the
trader should buy first if he/she wants to sell, or buy only after he/she sells in this
model. That is exactly the case in the real stock markets.
The MG is a negative sum game due to the minority essence of its payoffs. The
traders compete for the limited market resource and only those traders in the mi-
nority group are rewarded. Challet’s new model keeps the minority-game payoffs
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impacted by his/her own trades when the trader opens and close the position. Fur-
thermore, it introduces a new term of majority-game payoffs raised from the con-
tribution of other traders during his/her holding periods. The sum of the payoffs
therefore depends on the trading frequency and reaction time of each trader, and
thus makes the dynamics relatively complicated.
For the real financial market, the sum of the social wealth should be positive due
to the general increase of the social productivity. Traders are willing to trade in
the market which has a positive sum of the social wealth or at least has a zero
sum. The purpose of this paper is to construct a model with holding periods which
has a zero sum or positive sum. We first assume a zero wealth sum in our model
by introducing a simple mid-price dynamics with a linear price impact function.
Furthermore, a square root impact function revealed by the empirical study of the
real stock market [12, 13, 14] is considered, and the model consequently tends to
be a positive sum game. The payoff for each trader is naturally determined by the
difference between the selling price and the buying price. We name this model as
trading model due to the trading essence of the pair patterns.
In Sec. II, we first introduce a pattern-based speculation model by Challet, and then
introduce our trading model with pair pattern strategies. A comprehensive compar-
ison between the definition of the strategy space and the payoffs of our model and
that of Challet’s model is detailed presented. Some numerical results of our trading
model are subsequently presented. In Sec. III, a dynamic evolution mechanism is
introduced to the trading model, and the process how the traders are washed out and
how their wealth evolves are carefully studied. In Sec. IV, other types of traders are
introduced to the trading model, and Sec. V contains the conclusion.
2 Trading Model with Pattern-based Strategy Space
2.1 A pattern-based speculation model by Challet
The model proposed by Challet [11] consists of N traders, and they base their de-
cisions on patterns. Each trader i is able to recognize S patterns µi,1, · · ·, µi,S,
drawn randomly and uniformly from {1, · · ·, P} at the beginning of the game
and kept fixed throughout the game. Each trader i keeps track of the cumulative
price return between two consecutive occurrences of patterns, denoted by Ui,µ→ν ,
where µ, ν ∈ µi,1, · · ·, µi,S and µ 6= ν. At time t, the trader may wish to open
position only when the current history signal µ(t) is in his pattern list, that is,
µ(t) ∈ {µi,1, · · ·, µi,S}. The kind of position he/she might take, ai(t) = 0,±1
denoting inactive, buying and selling, is determined by average price return be-
tween two consecutive occurrences of patterns: if |Ui,µ→ν(t)| > ǫtµ→ν , where tµ→ν
is the total number of time-steps between patterns µ and ν and ǫ > 0 is a parameter,
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one buys a share (Ui,µ→ν(t) > 0) or sells a share (Ui,µ→ν(t) < 0), and then hold
his/her position until µ(t′) = ν. The excess demand is A(t) = ∑Ni=1 ai(t). A linear
price impact function is considered, and thus the price return is simply defined as
r(t) = p(t+ 1)− p(t) = A(t). (1)
Assume that µ(tµ) = µ and tν is the first subsequent occurrence of pattern ν, the
cumulative price return Ui,µ→ν between pattern µ and ν evolves according to
Ui,µ→ν(tν + 1) = Ui,µ→ν(tµ) + p(tν + 1)− p(tµ + 1)
− (1− |ai(tµ)|)ζi[A(tν)− A(tµ)], (2)
where ζi is a naivety factor indicating the reaction time of trader i. By adjusting
the value of the parameters ǫ and ζi, we observe that the model exhibits a withdraw
phenomena in its price evolution.
If trader i decides to open a position at time ti,µ and close his/her position at time
ti,ν , then his/her payoff is
ai[p(ti,ν + δti,ν)− p(ti,µ + δti,µ)] =− aiA(ti,µ, δti,µ) + ai
∑
ti,µ+δti,µ<t≤ti,ν
a(t)
− (−ai)A(ti,ν , δti,ν), (3)
A(ti,µ, δti,µ) =
∑
ti,µ<t≤ti,µ+δti,µ
a(t). (4)
δti,µ and δti,ν are one’s reaction time when he/she opens and closes position, which
may due to communication delays and the time needed to make a conscious deci-
sion. The first and the last terms are minority-game payoffs, which can be easily
recognize by their ’-’ sign: the trader is rewarded if he/she takes an action opposite
to the majority of the orders executed during the time delay. The central term which
has a ’+’ sign could be regarded as a delayed majority-game payoff: the trader is
rewarded if he/she takes an action consequently proved to be consistent with the
majority of the orders executed during the holding period. Therefore, the traders’
wealth depends on the situation of the market: the relative importance of minority
games decreases as the trading frequency decreases and increases as the reaction
time of each trader increases.
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2.2 Trading model with pair pattern strategies
The trading model takes the form of a repeated game with a certain number of
traders N . Different from challet’s model, we split the pattern strategy space into
several sub-spaces in units of pair patterns. A strategy consists of a pair of patterns
or history signals with explicit trading actions, labeled as (µ, ν), where µ is for
buying and ν is for selling. A pattern or history signal records the possible status
of the m most recent outcomes of the price change. Since there are a total of 2m
possible patterns and the patterns of one strategy should not repeat, there are a total
of 2m ∗ (2m − 1) probable pairs of patterns.
At the beginning of the game, each trader randomly picks S strategies from the full
strategy space and keep them fixed throughout the game. Each trader i keeps track
of the cumulative performance of his/her pair pattern strategy s, s = 1, ..., S by
assigning a virtual score Ui,s to it. The initial scores of the strategies are set to be
zero. At time t, each trader i adopts the strategy with the highest score si(t), and
checks if either of the two patterns of the highest score strategy is consistent with
the history at that moment. If the pattern for buying occurs first, the trader opens an
position by buying and holds the position until the pattern for selling occurs. Then
the trader closes the position by selling. The trader can also open the position by
selling if the pattern for seeling occurs first and then close the position by buying.
Therefore, the model is symmetric. The action will then be ai(t) = 0,±1, denotes
inactive, buying and selling. The excess demand is defined as A(t) =
N∑
i=1
ai(t).
We define a simple price dynamics of returns with a linear price impact function
the same as Eq. (1). Assuming that one of the patterns of a strategy occurs at time
t1 and t2 is the first subsequent occurrence of the other pattern, the score of the
strategy is updated according to the price difference between these two patterns as
Ui,s(t2 + 1) = Ui,s(t1) + p(tsi,ν + 1)− p(tsi,µ + 1), (5)
where si is the strategy of trader i. If the pattern for buying µ occurs first tsi,µ = t1
and tsi,ν = t2, and if the pattern for selling ν occurs first tsi,ν = t1 and tsi,µ = t2.
Therefore, the payoff of the strategy is determined by the profit made from the
strategy if it is adopted. In our model, we assume the traders are sophisticated and
compute perfectly the price return, and this makes Eq. (5) look like Eq. (2) with
ζi = 0.
A wealth Wi is assigned to each trader i. If trader i decides to open a position at
time t1 and closes it at time t2, the wealth is updated according to the price return
between these two trades as
Wi(t2 + 1) = Wi(t1) + p(ti,ν + 1)− p(ti,µ + 1). (6)
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If the trader opens a position by buying first ti,µ = t1 and ti,ν = t2, and if the trader
opens a position by selling first ti,ν = t1 and ti,µ = t2.
However, the model with payoffs defined as above is a negative-sum game, which
means that the sum of the wealth of all the traders is negative. Considering the
simplest case that the market only has one trader, the payoff of his/her wealth is
always −1 no matter what kind of position he/she might take first. We assume that
the model with linear price impact function has a nature of zero-sum. Inspired by
the works in Refs.[8, 15], a middle price is introduced p(t′+1) = 1
2
(p(t+1)+p(t)).
Supposing that not all the shares are executed at the price immediately after the
trades, the traders make trades at the middle price on average. The price return
defined with the linear price impact function is
r(t′) = p(t′ + 1)− p(t′) =
1
2
(A(t′) + A(t′ − 1)), (7)
where A(t′) = A(t). The score of the strategy and the wealth of each trader are
consequently updated according to the middle price, replacing t by t′ in Eqs. (5)
and (6). We simply assume that the trader has no reaction time, and therefore the
payoff looks like Eq. (3) with δt = 0. The sum of the traders’ wealth at time t′ is
∑
i
Wi(t
′) =
∑
i
1≤t′
i,1
,t′
i,2
≤t′∑
t′
i,1
,t′
i,2
[
1
2
A(t′i,1) +
1
2
A(t′i,2) +
∑
t′
i,1
<τ<t′
i,2
A(τ)], (8)
where t′i,1 is the time trader i opens a position and t′i,2 is the time trader i closes
it. For the model with line price impact function, the sum of the first two terms
approximately equals zero since the number of positions opened by traders equals
to that closed by traders. The sum of the traders’ wealth consequently depends on
the cumulative access demand contributed by the traders during the holding periods.
Recent empirical study shows that the volume imbalance seems to have a square
root impact on the price return [12, 13, 14]. Therefore, we also introduce a square
root impact function to the price return as
r(t′) = p(t′+1)−p(t′) =
1
2
(sign(A(t′))
√
|A(t′)|+sign(A(t′−1))
√
|A(t′ − 1)|).
(9)
The score of the strategy, the wealth of each trader and the sum of the traders’
wealth are consequently updated according to this price dynamics.
2.3 The results
Numerous numerical simulations are performed for this trading model with pair
pattern strategies, and the results for S = 2 and m = 3 are mainly reported. The
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price evolution of the trading model with linear price impact function for N = 100,
and square root price impact function for N = 100, 1000 and different initial seeds
are plotted in Fig. 1(a) and (b). For the model with linear price impact function,
the curve for N = 100 fluctuates symmetrically around zero, and the curve for
other value of the parameter N behaves similar to that of N = 100 (not shown
in figure). For the model with square root price impact function, it seems that the
price fluctuates similar to that of the financial markets. However, we observe some
attractors for some singular runs, for example the curve for N = 100 with seed2
changes suddenly close to t′ = 5.0 ∗ 105 and then the system stuck in a string of
periodical history states which may leads to the abnormal increase of the price.
We first compute the conditional probability p(u, j), which is the conditional prob-
ability to have positive, negative and zero price change, denoted by j = ±1, 0,
immediately following a specific history u. In Fig. 2(a), (b) and (c), p(u, j) for the
trading model with linear price impact function for N = 50, 100, 1000 are plotted.
In general, the histograms are not as flat as that of the MG model [16] which means
the model has a bias of price change conditional to a specific history. We observe
that the histogram for larger N is less flat than the histogram for smaller N , which
means the price has a relative strong biased tendency at large values of the parame-
ter N . In Fig. 3(a), (b) and (c), p(u, j) for the trading model with square root price
impact function for N = 50, 100, 1000 are plotted. The curves for the model with
square root price impact function is less flat than those of the model with linear
price impact function.
The variance of returns is a convenient reciprocal measure of the market fluctuation,
and it is defined as
σ2 =
< r2 > − < r >2
P
. (10)
The smaller σ2 is, the less the return fluctuates. In Fig. 4, the variance σ2 for the
trading models with linear and square root price impact functions are plotted, de-
noted by black and red circles respectively. σ2 for the model with linear price im-
pact function increases as the increase of the parameter N , and obeys power laws
with exponents 0.79 for N ∈ [10, 100) and 1.81 for N ∈ [100, 1000). σ2 for the
model with square root price impact function obeys power laws with exponents
0.59 for N ∈ [10, 100), and 0.92 for N ∈ [100, 1000). Compared with the model
with linear price impact function, the model with square root price impact function
has a smaller magnitude of the price fluctuation though it has a stronger biased
tendency of the price change.
To further understand the price return bias conditional to the market states, we
compute the average return conditional to a given history defined as
H =
∑
u〈r|u〉
2
P
. (11)
In Fig. 4, H for the trading models with linear and square root price impact func-
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tions are also plotted, denoted by black and red stars respectively. H increases
as the increase of the parameter N , displaying a behavior similar to that of σ2.
H for the model with linear price impact function seems saturated and fluctuates
slightly for N ∈ [10, 100), then obeys a nice power law with an exponent 1.64 for
N ∈ [100, 1000). H for the model with square root price impact function obeys a
power law with an exponent 0.95 for N ∈ [100, 1000). These two exponents are
close to the half of the exponents of their price impact functions, which indicates H
can be considered as an approximate measure of the average price impact for large
values of the parameter N .
Another important variable is the predictability that the traders hope to exploit from
the pair patterns
K =
1
P (P − 1)
∑
µ,ν,µ6=ν
〈r(t)|µ→ ν〉2, (12)
where 〈r(t)|µ → ν〉 stands for the average price return per time step between the
occurrence of µ at time t and the next occurrence of ν. In Fig. 5, the predictability
K for the model with linear and square root price impact functions are plotted. For
the model with linear price impact function, K increases at the early stage of the
parameter N , and shows an unclear behavior due to the unneglectable oscilation
for N ∈ [10, 100), then follows a power-law behavior with an exponent 1.58 for
N ∈ [100, 1000). For the model with square root price impact function, K is a
monotonously increasing function of the parameter N , and obeys a power law with
an exponent 0.96 for N ∈ [100, 1000). The model with square root price impact
function is more predictable than the model with linear price impact function for
N ∈ [40, 400], and tends to be less predictable if we further increase the parameter
N .
We then consider the wealth of the traders. The average wealth for each trader
W =
∑
i
Wi
N
is calculated. In Fig. 6, the average wealth for each trader for different
values of the parameter N at t′ = 106 are plotted. The circles and stars are for the
trading models with linear and square root price impact functions respectively. The
average wealth for the model with linear price impact function is close to zero in-
dependent of the parameter N , which indicates that the system is a zero-sum game.
Remarkably, the model with square root price impact displys a positive wealth sum:
the curve increases as the increase of the parameter N and can be nicely fitted by a
power law with an exponent 0.47.
To understand why the trading model with linear price impact function displays a
zero sum and the trading model with square root price impact function displays a
positive sum, we further investigate the average excess demand bias 〈A|u〉 condi-
tional to a specific history u. In Fig. 7 (a), (b) and (c), 〈A|u〉 for the trading models
with linear and square root price impact functions (represented by black and red cir-
cles respectively) forN = 50, 100, 1000 are plotted. For the model with linear price
impact function, the sum of the trader’s wealth mainly depends on the cumulative
access demand contributed by the traders during the holding periods according to
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Eq. (8). Assuming that the game visits each possible history with a equal proba-
bility, so the sum over τ between two consecutive actions of opening and closing
a position could be substituted by the sum over the possible history states between
them. 〈A|u〉 for trading model with linear price impact function is symmetrically
distributed above and below zero for different states of history u. |∑u〈A|u〉| dis-
plays a value close to zero. Therefore, we observe a zero wealth sum.
The sum of the traders’ wealth for the model with square root price impact func-
tion mainly depends on the cumulative square root impact of the access demand
contributed by the traders during the holding periods, supposing that the sum of the
square root impact of the excess demand at which the traders open and close their
positions equals zero, i.e., ∑i
∑1≤t′
i,1
,t′
i,2
≤t′
t′
i,1
,t′
i,2
[1
2
sign(t′i,1)
√
A(t′i,1)+
1
2
sign(A(t′i,2))
√
A(t′i,2)] =
0, where t′i,1 is the time trader i opens a position and t′i,2 is the time trader i closes
it. 〈A|u〉 for the model with square root price impact function is unsymmetrically
distributed above and below zero. |∑u〈A|u〉| displays a nonzero value obviously
larger than that of the model with linear price impact function, e.g., the ratio of
|
∑
u〈A|u〉| between two models with square root and linear price impact functions
is 7.56, 18.58, 62.66 for N = 50, 100, 1000 . The larger the parameter N is, the
more unsymmetrical the distribution of 〈A|u〉 is. Some traders have certain strate-
gies which can help them to effectively exploit the information of the biased excess
demand from the patterns, and they make profits from these high-performed strate-
gies. They have wealth greater than zero while other traders have an average wealth
close to zero. This may leads to a positive sum for the model with square root im-
pact function.
In Fig. 8 (a), the wealth distribution of the traders for the model with square root
price impact function for N = 100 is plotted according to the rank of their change
frequency of the adopted strategies. We observe that the traders who change their
strategies more frequently have less wealth. Some traders keep using their high-
performed strategies to make more profits, while the others who do not have these
strategies always shift among their strategies and have less wealth. Especially for
some singular runs with attractors, we observe that some traders keep using certain
high-performed strategies and the others shift among their strategies at the early
stage of the evolution and eventually withdraw from the market and thus the system
is stuck in a string of period history states. For the model with linear price impact
function, the wealth distribution shows a similar behavior but displays a zero sum.
3 Trading Model with Evolution
MG-based models with dynamic evolution have been studied in Refs. [6, 17, 18].
For example, in Refs. [17, 18] the traders can change their strategies with poor
performances. In this trading model, we assume that the worst trader can be driven
9
out of the market following Ref [6]. Every 100 time steps the trader who has the
lowest wealth is washed out and a new trader with new randomly selected strategies
is generated. The wealth of the new trader is set to be the average wealth of the
traders at that moment. We use the square root price impact function of the real
markets in this evolutionary trading model. With this evolution mechanism, the
price evolution becomes more continuously, and seems to be similar to that of the
real markets as it is shown in Fig. 1.
The conditional probability p(u, j) for different values of the parameterN = 100, 1000
for this evolutionary trading model are plotted in Fig. 9 (a) and Fig. 9 (b). It seems
that the histograms of the model with evolution are more flat than those of the
model without evolution for the same values of the parameter N . The introduc-
tion of the elimination mechanism leads to a relatively week biased tendency of
the price change. σ2, H and K for the evolutionary model are also effectively de-
creased. In general, the elimination mechanism breaks down the domination of the
strategies highly performed in the trading model and makes the price fluctuations
relatively symmetric.
In Fig. 10, the number of the traders still survive evolved with time t′ is plotted. For
a large number of traders, e.g., N = 1000, those traders who have the strategy (2,5)
could survive for quite a long time and are finally washed out one after another in
a short time region. There is no high-performed strategy always keep winning after
we introduce the elimination mechanism. We also observe that the time at which
the traders are washed out mainly depends on the parameter N . Fig. 11 shows the
time t′ at which Ps percentage of the traders are washed out as a function of the
parameter N . t′ increases as the increase of the parameter N , and obeys a power
law with an exponent close to 1.05 not much different for different values of the
parameter Ps = 25%, 50%, 75%.
Let’s take a look at how the traders’ wealth evolve before they are washed out. In
Fig. 12, the distribution of the relative wealth (Wi(t′) −W )/W at different time
t′ = 1×106, 2×106, 2×107 are plotted, where i is the rank of the trader’s wealth and
W is the average wealth of the traders at time t′. For t′ = 1×106, the relative wealth
is not continuous distributed among the traders. Those traders who have higher
wealth are clustered in different groups. For t′ = 2 × 106, the distribution remains
similar, but the relative wealth difference between the rich traders and the poor
traders is not so large and thus the curve becomes more flat. At the time just before
all the traders are washed out, e.g., t′ = 2 × 107, the relative wealth distribution
becomes even more flat.
The wealth distribution of the traders ranked by their age (survival time) for the
trading model with evolution is plotted in Fig. 8 (b). We observe that all the traders
have positive wealth due to the evolution mechanism. Those elder traders have
relatively more wealth than those younger traders, and those traders newly gener-
ated have an average wealth among them. In Fig. 13, the return distributions of the
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models with and without evolution for a single run are plotted. Though the return
distributions of both models decay exponentially, the model with evolution has a
tail fatter than the model without evolution.
4 Trading Model with Other Types of Traders
We introduce the traders who have the strategies the same as those in the MG model
[1, 2], which give the predictions for all the probable history status, to the trading
model with square root price impact function but without evolution. Each of these
newly introduced traders has the same number of S randomly selected strategies,
and they trade at each time step using their best strategies according to the pattern
(or history) shared by all the traders. Let Nt and Nm be the number of the traders
who have the pair pattern strategies and who have the strategies the same as those
in the MG model. Then the excess demand is defined as A(t) = ∑Nt+Nmi=1 ai(t),
and the price dynamics remains the same as Eq. (9). The score of the pair pattern
strategy takes the same update form as Eq. (5), and the score of the MG’s strategy
is updated as Ui,s(t′ + 1) = Ui,s(t′)− ai(t′)(P (t′ + 1)− P (t′)), i = 1, ..., Nm.
The conditional probability p(u, j) and the wealth distribution of the traders ranked
by their change frequency of the adopted strategies for Nt = 100 and Nm = 25
are plotted in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 (a). The number of the traders effectively trade at
each time step Nteff : Nmeff = 1 : 1. The histogram of the conditional probability
becomes much more flat than that of the model has pure traders who have the pair
pattern strategies, and the sum of the wealth of the traders who have the pair pattern
strategies tends to be negative. The traders who have the MG’s strategies distinctly
affect the behavior of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies.
We fix the number of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies Nt = 100, and
increase the number of the traders who have the MG’s strategies one by one and see
how the traders’ wealth behave. In Fig. 16 (a), the average wealth of the traders who
have the pair pattern strategies and the traders who have the MG’s strategies for Nm
ranging from 1 to 25 at fixed Nt = 100 are plotted. For a small Nm, the average
wealth of the traders who have the MG’s strategies is positive and larger than that
of the traders who have pair pattern strategies. Few number of the traders dominant
the game, and are fed by the rest majority traders who have positive wealth sum.
Interestingly, at Nm ∼ 5 the average wealth of both types of traders reaches a
maximum. Those two types of traders seem to have a certain state of corporation.
As we further increase Nm, the average wealth of the traders who have the MG’s
strategies tends to be negative and smaller than that of the traders who have pair
pattern strategies.
Another case that the total number of the traders is fixed is also considered, i.e.,
Nt+Nm = 100. We change the proportion of Nt to the total number of the traders.
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In Fig. 16 (b), the average wealth of both types of traders are plotted for fixed
Nt + Nm = 100. The average wealth of the traders who have the MG’s strategies
increases with the increase of the proportion of Nt/100, while the average wealth
of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies decreases with the increase of the
proportion of Nt/100. For a small Nt/100, the average wealth of the traders who
have the MG’s strategies is negative and smaller than that of the traders who have
the pair pattern strategies, and tends to be positive and larger than that of the traders
who have the pair pattern strategies for Nt/100 ∼ 0.9. That is consistent with the
result we obtained for fixed Nt = 100 shown in Fig. 16 (a).
We also introduce the traders who only have one MG’s strategy known as ”pro-
ducers” [4] to the trading model with square root price impact function but without
evolution. As it is shown in Fig. 15 (b), the introduce of this type of traders can
effectively increase the wealth of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies.
Most of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies have positive wealth, but
the wealth distribution is more fluctuated than the model with the traders who have
the MG’s strategies shown in Fig. 15 (a).
5 Conclusion
In summary, trading model with pair pattern strategies evolved with middle price
is introduced. Both linear price impact function and empirical square root impact
function are considered in the price dynamics, and power-law behaviors are ob-
served for the return variance σ2, the price impact H and the predictability K at
the large values of the parameter N . The sum of the traders’ wealth displays a
positive value for the trading model with square root price impact function. An un-
symmetrically distribution of the conditional excess demand 〈A|u〉 is observed, and
based on this observation we give a qualitative explanation for the positive wealth
sum for the model with square root price impact function. In addition, an evolution
mechanism is introduced to the trading model. The introduction of new traders with
randomly selected strategies breaks down the domination of the strategies highly
performed in the model without evolution, and leads to a relatively small value for
the biased tendency of the price change, as well as σ2, H and K. Power-law behav-
ior is observed for the time t′ at which Ps percentage of the traders are washed out,
and the relative wealth difference between the rich and poor traders becomes much
smaller when the time approaches the point that all the traders are washed out. The
traders with the MG’s strategies are also introduced to the trading mode. The small
friction of the mixed traders are fed by the rest majority of traders, and thus have
relatively more wealth. We also introduce the traders known as producers to this
trading model, and find it leads to an effectively increase of the traders’ wealth.
Acknowledgments:
12
During this work, we have enjoyed the support and hospitality of ISI, Torino, Italy
and Renmin Univ, Beijing, China.
References
[1] D. Challet, Y.-C. Zhang, Emergence of cooperation and organization in an
evolutionary game 246 (1997) 407–418.
[2] Y.-C. Zhang, Modeling market mechanism with evolutionary games, Euro-
phys. News 29 (1998) 51–54.
[3] W. B. Arthur, Inductive reasoning and bounded rationality 84 (1994) 406–
411.
[4] D. Challet, M. Marsili, Y.-C. Zhang, Stylized facts of financial markets and
market crashes in minority games 294 (2001) 514–524.
[5] P. Jefferies, M. L. Hart, P. M. Hui, N. F. Johnson, From market games to
real-world markets 20 (2001) 493–501.
[6] D. Challet, M. Chessa, A.and Marsili, Y.-C. Zhang, From minority games to
real markets 1 (2001) 168–176.
[7] I. Giardina, J.-P. Bouchaud, Bubbles, crashes and intermittency in agent based
market models 31 (2003) 421–437.
[8] J. V. Andersen, D. Sornette, The $-game 31 (2003) 141–145.
[9] See the Minority Game’s web page on
http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/minority.
[10] F. Ren, B. Zheng, T. Qiu, S. Trimper, Minority games with score-dependent
and agent-dependent payoffs 74 (2006) 041111.
[11] D. Challet, Inter-pattern speculation: Beyond minority, majority and $-games
32 (2008) 85–100.
[12] V. Plerou, P. Gopikrishnan, X. Gabaix, H. E. Stanley, Quantifying stock-price
response to demand fluctuations 66 (2002) 027104.
[13] X. Gabaix, P. Gopikrishnan, V. Plerou, H. E. Stanley, A Theory of Power-Law
Distributions in Financial Market Fluctuations, Nature 423 (2003) 267–270.
[14] J. Hasbrouck, Measuring the information content of stock trades 46 (1991)
179–207.
[15] J. D. Farmer, Market force, ecology and evolution, Industrial and Corporate
Change 11 (2002) 895–953.
[16] R. Savit, R. Manuca, R. Riolo, Adaptive competition, market efficiency, and
phase transitions 82 (1999) 2203–2206.
[17] M. Sysi-Aho, A. Chakraborti, K. Kaski, Adaptation using hybridized genetic
crossover strategies 322 (2003) 701–709.
[18] Y. Li, R. Riolo, R. Savit, Evolution in minority games. (I). Games with a fixed
strategy space 276 (2000) 234–264.
13
0 2×105 4×105 6×105 8×105 1×106
-3.0×101
-2.0×101
-1.0×101
0.0
1.0×101
2.0×101
3.0×101
t’
P(t’)
0 2×105 4×105 6×105 8×105 1×106
0.0
5.0×104
1.0×105
1.5×105
2.0×105
N=100, seed2
N=100, seed1
N=1000, seed1
N=100, seed1, with evolution
N=1000, seed1, with evolution
t’
P(t’)
Fig. 1. (a) Price evolution of the trading model with linear price impact function at
N = 100, S = 2 and m = 3. (b) Price evolution of the trading model with square root
price impact function for different values of the parameter N and different initial seeds at
S = 2 and m = 3. 106 data are collected after 500 iterations for equilibrium.
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Fig. 2. Conditional probability p(u, j) of the model with linear price impact function for:
(a) N = 50, (b) N = 100, (c) N = 1000 at S = 2 and m = 3.
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Fig. 3. Conditional probability p(u, j) of the model with linear price impact function for:
(a) N = 50, (b) N = 100, (c) N = 1000 at S = 2 and m = 3.
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Fig. 4. Variance of returns σ2 (circles) and price impact H (stars) for the trading models
with linear and square root price impact functions at S = 2 and m = 3, represented by
black and red symbols respectively. The results take average over 100 runs.
1 10 100 1000
0.01
0.10
1.00
N
K
slope ~ 1.58
slope ~ 0.96
Fig. 5. Predictability K for the trading models with linear and square root price impact
functions at S = 2 and m = 3, represented by black and red circles respectively. The
results take average over 100 runs.
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Fig. 6. Average wealth for each trader for the trading models with linear and square root
price impact functions at S = 2 and m = 3, represented by circles and stars respectively.
The solid line is the fitting curve W ∼ N0.47.
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Fig. 8. (a) Wealth distribution of traders and change frequency of adopted strategies for
the model with square root price impact function for N = 100 at S = 2 and m = 3,
represented by dashed and solid lines separately. (b) Wealth distribution and age of traders
for the trading model with evolution for N = 1000 at S = 2 and m = 3, represented by
dashed and solid lines separately.
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Fig. 9. Conditional probability p(u, j) of the trading model with evolution for: (a)N = 100,
(b)N = 1000 at S = 2 and m = 3.
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Fig. 10. Number of traders still survive evolves with time t′ for the trading model with
evolution at S = 2, m = 3, and N = 1000.
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Fig. 11. Time t′ at which Ps percentage of the traders are washed out for the trading model
with evolution at S = 2 and m = 3.
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Fig. 12. Relative wealth distribution (Wit′ − W )/W at different time
t′ = 1 × 106, 2 × 106, 2 × 107, 5 × 107 for the trading model with evolution at
S = 2, m = 3 and N = 1000.
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Fig. 13. Return distribution of the trading models with and without evolution for S = 2,
m = 3 and N = 1000, represented by red and black lines separately.
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Fig. 14. Conditional probability p(u, j) for the trading model with mixed population
Nt = 100 and Nm = 25 at S = 2 and m = 3.
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Fig. 15. Wealth distribution and the change frequency of the adopted strategies of the
traders who have the pair pattern strategies for the trading model with mixed population:
(a) Nt = 100 and Nm = 25, (b) Nt = 100 and Np = 100 (the number of the traders known
as producers) at S = 2 and m = 3, represented by dashed and solid lines separately.
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Fig. 16. Average wealth of the traders who have the pair pattern strategies and average
wealth of the traders who have the MG’s strategies for the trading model with mixed popu-
lation: (a) Nm ranging from 1 to 25 at fixed Nt = 100, (b) different proportion of Nt/100
at fixed Nt +Nm = 100 for S = 2 and m = 3.
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